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Abstract. The concept of anonymity comes into play in a wide range of sit-
uations, varying from voting and anonymous donations to postings on bulletin
boards and sending mails. The systems for ensuring anonymity often use random
mechanisms which can be described probabilistically, while the agents’ interest
in performing the anonymous action may be totally unpredictable, irregular, and
hence expressable only nondeterministically.
Formal definitions of the concept of anonymity have been investigated in the past
either in a totally nondeterministic framework, or in a purely probabilistic one.
In this paper, we investigate a notion of anonymity which combines both proba-
bility and nondeterminism, and which is suitable for describing the most general
situation in which both the systems and the user can have both probabilistic and
nondeterministic behavior. We also investigate the properties of the definition
for the particular cases of purely nondeterministic users and purely probabilistic
users.
We formulate our notions of anonymity in terms of observables for processes in
the probabilistic pi-calculus, whose semantics is based on Probabilistic Automata.
We illustrate our ideas by using the example of the dining cryptographers.
1 Introduction
The concept of anonymity comes into play in those cases in which we want to keep
secret the identity of the agent participating to a certain event. There is a wide range
of situations in which this property may be needed or desirable; for instance: delation,
voting, anonymous donations, and posting on bulletin boards.
An important characteristic of anonymity is that it is usually relative to a particular
point of view. In general an event can be observed from various viewpoints - differing in
the information they give access to, and therefore, the anonymity property depends on
the view from which the event is being looked at (that is the exact information available
to the observer). For example, in the situation of electronic bulletin boards, a posting by
one member of the group is kept anonymous to the other members; however, it may be
possible that the administrator of the board has access to some privileged information
and can determine the member who posted the message(s), either directly or indirectly.
In general anonymity may be required for a subset of the agents only. In order to
completely define anonymity for a system it is therefore necessary to specify which
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set(s) of members has to be kept anonymous. A further generalization is the concept
of group anonymity: the members are divided into a number of sets, and it is revealed
which of the groups is responsible for an event, but the information as to which partic-
ular member has performed the event must be hidden. In this paper, however, we do not
consider the notion of group anonymity, we leave it for further work.
Various formal definitions and frameworks for analyzing anonymity have been de-
veloped in literature. They can be classified into approaches based on process-calculi
([24, 22]), epistemic logic ([26, 11]), and “function views” ([13]). In this paper, we fo-
cus on the approach based on process-calculi.
The framework and techniques of process calculi have been used extensively in
the area of security, to formally define security properties, and to verify cryptographic
protocols. See, for instance, [2, 15, 21, 23, 3]. The common denominator is that the var-
ious entities involved in the system to verify are specified as concurrent processes and
present typically a nondeterministic behavior. In [24, 22], the nondeterminism plays
a crucial role to define the concept of anonymity. More precisely, this approach to
anonymity is based on the so-called “principle of confusion”: a system is anonymous
if the set of the possible outcomes is saturated with respect to the intended anonymous
users, i.e. if one such user can cause a certain observable trace in one possible com-
putation, then there must be alternative computations in which each other anonymous
user can give rise to the same observable trace (modulo the identity of the anonymous
users).
The principle of anonymity described above is very elegant and general, however it
has a limitation: Many systems for anonymity use random mechanisms. See, for exam-
ple, Crowds ([20]) and Onion Routing ([27]). If the observer has the means to repeat the
experiment and perform statistical analysis, he may be able to deduce certain quantita-
tive information on the system. In particular, he may be able to compute the probability
of certain observables and from that infer the probability of the relation between users
and observables. Now, the situation of perfect anonymity can be only achieved when
one cannot differenciate the agents by the observable. However this condition cannot
be expressed in the nondeterministic approach, since the latter is based on set-theoretic
notions, and it is therefore only able to detect the difference between possible and im-
possible (which in the finite case correspond to positive and zero probability respec-
tively). Even the case in which one user has probability close to 1 will be considered
acceptable by the definition of anonymity based on nondeterminism, provided that all
the other users have positive probability.
Probabilistic information also allows to classify various notions of anonymity ac-
cording to their strength. See for instance the hierarchy proposed by Reiter and Robin
([20]). In this paper we explore a notion of anonymitywhich corresponds to the strongest
one (perfect anonymity: from the observables we deduce no information about the pos-
sible user).
A probabilistic notion of anonymity was developed (as a part of a general episte-
mological approach) in [11]. The approach there is purely probabilistic, in the sense
that both the system and the users are assumed to act probabilistically. In particular the
emphasis is on the probabilistic behavior of the users.
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In this work, we take the opposite point of view, namely we assume that nothing
may be known about the relative frequency by which the users perform the anonymous
action. More precisely, the users can in principle be totally unpredictable and change in-
tention every day, so that their behavior cannot be described probabilistically, not even
by repeating statistical observations. The mechanisms of the systems, on the contrary,
are like coin tossing, or random selection of a nearby node, are supposed to exhibit
a certain regularity and obey a probabilistic distribution. Hence, we investigate a no-
tion of anonymity which combines both probability and nondeterminism, and which
is suitable for describing the most general situation in which both the systems and the
user can have both probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior. We also investigate the
properties of the definition for the particular cases of purely nondeterministic users and
purely probabilistic users.
In order to define the notion of probability we need, of course, a model of com-
putation able to express both probabilistic and nondeterministic choices. This kind of
systems is by now well established in literature, see for instance the probabilistic au-
tomata of [25], and have been provided with solid mathematical foundations and so-
phisticated tools for verification. These models have practically replaced nowadays the
purely probabilistic models since it was recognized that nondeterministic behavior is
not “probabilistic behavior with unknown probabilities”, but rather a phenomenon on
its own, which is needed to describe situations in which an entity has a completely
unpredictable and irregular behavior.
For reasons of space we omit the proofs and we only sketch the preliminary notions.
The full details can be found on the report version of this paper, available on line ([4]).
2 The nondeterministic approach to anonymity
In this section we briefly recall the approach in [24, 22]. In these works, the actions of
a system S are classified into three sets which determine the “point of view”:
– A: the actions that are intended to be known anonymously by the observer,
– B: the actions that are intended to be known completely by the observer,
– C: the actions that are intended to be abstracted (hidden) to the observer.
Typically the set A consists of actions of the form a.i, where a is a fixed “abstract”
action (the same for all the elements ofA), and i represents the identity of an anonymous
user. Hence A = {a.i | i ∈ I}., where I is the set of all the identities of the anonymous
users.
Consider a dummy action d (different from all actions in S) and let f be the function
on the actions of A⋃B defined by f(α) = d if α ∈ A, and f(α) = α otherwise. Then
S is said to be (strongly) anonymous on the actions in A if f −1(f(S\C)) ∼T S\C,
where, following the CSP notation ([5]), S\C is the system resulting from hiding C in
S, f(S′) is the system obtained from S ′ by applying the relabeling f to each (visible)
action, f−1 is the relation inverse of f , and∼T represents trace equivalence.
Intuitively, the above definition means that for any action sequence "α ∈ A ∗, if an
observable trace t containing "α (not necessarily as a consecutive sequence) is a possible
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Fig. 1. Chaum’s system for the Dining Cryptographers ([7, 22]).
outcome of S\C, then, any trace t ′ obtained from t by replacing "α with an arbitrary
"α ′ ∈ A∗ must also be a possible outcome of S\C.
We now illustrate the above definition on the example of the Dining Cryptographers.
3 The Dining Cryptographers’ Problem
This problem, described by Chaum in [7], involves a situation in which three cryptogra-
phers are dining together. At the end of the dinner, each of them is secretly informed by
a central agency (master) whether she should pay the bill, or not. So, either the master
will pay, or one of the cryptographers will be asked to pay. The cryptographers (or some
external observer) would like to find out whether the payer is one of them or the master.
However, if the payer is one of them, they also wish to maintain anonymity over the
identity of the payer.
A possible solution to this problem, described in [7], is that each cryptographer
tosses a coin, which is visible to herself and her neighbor to the right. Each cryptog-
rapher observes the two coins that she can see and announces agree or disagree. If a
cryptographer is not paying, she will announce agree if the two sides are the same and
disagree if they are not. However, the paying cryptographer will say the opposite. It
can be proved that if the number of disagrees is even, then the master is paying; other-
wise, one of the cryptographers is paying. Furthermore, if one of the cryptographers is
paying, then neither an external observer nor the other two cryptographers can identify,
from their individual information, who exactly his paying.
The Dining Cryptographers (DC) will be a running example through the paper.
3.1 Nondeterministic Dining Cryptographers
In this approach the outcome of the coin tossing and the decision of the master regarding
the payment of bill are considered to be nondeterministic ([24, 22]).
The specification of the solution can be given in a process calculus style as illus-
trated below. In the original works ([24, 22]) the authors used CSP. For the sake of
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Master =
P2
i=0 τ .mip .mi⊕1n .mi⊕2n . 0
+ τ.m0n .m1n . m2n . 0
Crypt i = mi(x) . ci,i(y) . ci,i⊕1(z) .
if x = p
then pay i . if y = z
then out idisagree
else out iagree
else if y = z
then out iagree
else out idisagree
Coini = τ .Head i + τ .Tail i
Head i = ci,ihead . ci"1,ihead . 0
Tail i = ci,itail . ci"1,itail . 0
DCP = (ν $m)(Master
| (ν$c)(Π2i=0Crypt i | Π2i=0Coini) )
Table 1. The dining cryptographer protocol specified in pi-calculus.
uniformity we use here the pi-calculus ([18]). We recall that + (∑) is the nondetermin-
istic sum and | (Π) is the parallel composition. 0 is the empty process. τ is the silent
(or internal) action. cm and c(x) are, respectively, send and receive actions on channel
c, where m is the message being transmitted and x is the formal parameter. ν is an
operator that, in the pi-calculus, has multiple purposes: it provides abstraction (hiding),
enforces synchronization, and generates new names. For more details on the pi-calculus
and its semantics, we refer to [18, 17].
In the code, given in Table 1,⊕ and$ represent the sum and the subtractionmodulo
3. Messages p and n sent by the master are the requests to pay or to not pay, respectively.
pay i is the action of paying for cryptographer i.
We remark that we do not need all the expressive power of the pi-calculus for this
program.More precisely, we do not need guarded choice (all the choices are internal be-
cause they start with τ ), and we do not need neither name-passing nor scope extrusion,
thus ν is used just like the restriction operator of CCS ([16]).
Let us consider the point of view of an external observer. The actions that are to be
hidden (set C) are the communications of the decision of the master and the results of
the coins ("m, "c). These are already hidden in the definition of the system DCP . The
anonymous users are of course the cryptographers, and the anonymous actions (set A)
is constituted by the pay i actions, for i = 0, 1, 2. The set B is constituted by the actions
of the form out iagree and out idisagree , for i = 0, 1, 2.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of Example 1: the results that are observed with high frequency.
Let f be the function f(pay i) = pay and f(α) = α for all the other actions. It
is possible to check that f−1(f(DCP ))) ∼T DCP , where we recall that ∼T stands
for trace equivalence. Hence the nondeterministic notion of anonymity, as defined in
Section 2, is verified.
3.2 Limitations of the nondeterministic approach
As a result of the nondeterminism, we cannot differentiate between a fair coin and an
unfair one. However, it is evident that the fairness of the coins is essential to ensure the
anonymity property in the system, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 1. Assume that, whenever a cryptographer pays, an external observer obtains
almost always (i.e. with high frequency, say 99% of the times) one of the three outcomes
represented in Figure 2, where a stands for agree and d for disagree. What can the
observer deduce? By examining all possible cases, it is easy to see that the coins must
be biased, and more precisely, Coin 0 and Coin1 must produce almost always head,
and Coin2 must produce almost always tail (or vice-versa). From this estimation, it is
immediate to conclude that, in the first case, the payer is almost for sure Crypt 1, in the
second case Crypt 2, and in the third case Crypt 0.
In the situation illustrated in the above example, clearly, the system does not provide
anonymity. However the nondeterministic definition of anonymity is still satisfied (as
long as “almost always” is not “always”, which in terms of observations means that the
fourth configuration d, a, a must also appear, from time to time). The problem is that
that definition can only express whether or not it is possible to have a particular trace,
but cannot express whether one trace is more likely than the other.
3.3 Probabilistic Dining Cryptographers
The probabilistic version of the system can be obtained from the nondeterministic one
by attaching probabilities to the the outcome of the coin tossing. We wish to remark that
this is the essential change in perspective: the randommechanisms internal to the system
which is designed to ensure anonymity are assumed to have a probabilistic behavior.
As for the choices of the master, those are in a sense external to the system, and it is
secondary whether they are nondeterministic or probabilistic.
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We start by considering a nondeterministicmaster, which is in a sense the basic case:
the fact that the master is nondeterministic means that we cannot assume any regularity
in its behavior, nobody has any information about it, not even a probabilistic one. The
anonymity system must then assure that this complete lack of knowledge be preserved
through the observations of the possible outcomes (except, of course, for gaining the
information on whether the payer is one of the cryptographers or not).
We use the probabilistic pi-calculus (pip) introduced in [12, 19] to represent the prob-
abilistic system. The essential difference with respect to the pi-calculus is the presence
of a probabilistic choice operator of the form ∑i piαi.Pi, where the pi’s represents
probabilities, i.e. they satisfy pi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i pi = 1, and the αi’s are non-output
prefixes, i.e. either input or silent prefixes. (Actually, for the purpose of this paper, only
silent prefixes are used.) For the detailed presentation of this calculus we refer to [12,
19, 4].
The only difference with respect to the program presented in Section 3.1 is the
definition of the Coin i’s, which is as follows (ph and pt represent the probabilities of
the outcome of the coin tossing):
Coin i = phτ .Head i + ptτ .Tail i
It is clear that the system obtained in this way combines probabilistic and nondeter-
ministic behavior, not only because the master is nondeterministic, but also because the
various components of the system and their internal interactions can follow different
scheduling policies, selected nondeterministically (although it can be proved that this
latter form of nondeterminism is not relevant for this particular problem).
This kind of systems (combining probabilistic and nondeterministic choices) is by
now well established in literature, see for instance the probabilistic automata of [25],
and have been provided with solid mathematical foundations and sophisticated tools
for verification. In particular, we are interested here in the definition of the probability
associated to a certain observable. The canonical way of defining such a probability is
the following: First we solve the nondeterminism, i.e. we determine a function (sched-
uler) which, for each nondeterministic choice in the the computation tree, selects one
alternative. After pruning the tree from all the non-selected alternatives, we obtain a
fully probabilistic automaton, and we can define the probabilities of (measurable) sets
of runs (and therefore of the intended observables) in the standard way. See [4] for the
details.
One thing that should be clear, from the description above, is that in general the
probability of an observable depends on the given scheduler.
4 Probabilistic anonymity for nondeterministic users
In this section we propose our notion of probabilistic anonymity for the case in which
the anonymous user is selected nondeterministically.
The system in which the anonymous users live and operate is modeled as a prob-
abilistic automatonM ([25], see [4]. Following [24, 22] we classify the actions of M
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into the three sets A,B and C (cfr. Section 2). As before, these three sets are deter-
mined by the set of the anonymous users, the specific type of action on which we want
anonymity, and the observer. We only change notation slightly:
– The set of the anonymous actions: A = {a(i) | i ∈ I}, where I is the set of the
identities of the anonymous users and a is an injective functions from I to the set
of actions which we call abstract action. We also call the pair (I, a) anonymous
action generator.
– The set of the actions that we observe entirely, B. We will use b, b ′, . . . to denote
the elements of this set.
– The set of the hidden actions C.
It should be remarked the the term “observable” here is relative: we assume that the
observer can observe only B and a, but, to the purpose of defining anonymity and
checking whether a system is anonymous, we need the elements of A to be visible
outcomes of the system.
Definition 1. An anonymity system is a tuple (M, I, a,B,Z , p), where M is a proba-
bilistic automaton which we assume already restricted (abstracted) on C, (I, a) is an
anonymous action generator,B is a set of observable actions, Z is the set of all possible
schedulers for M , and for every ς ∈ Z , pς is a probability measure on the event space
generated by the execution tree ofM under ς (denoted by etree(M, ς)), i.e. the σ–field
generated by the cones in etree(M, ς) (cfr. [4]).
Note that, as expressed by the above definition, given a scheduler ς , an event is a
set of executions in etree(M, ς). We introduce the following notation to represent the
events of interest:
– a(i) : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing the action a(i)
– a : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing an action a(i) for an arbitrary i
– o : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing as their maximal sequence of ob-
servable actions the sequence o (where o is of the form 〈b1, b2, . . . , bn〉 for some
b1, b2, . . . , bn ∈ B). We denote by O the set of all such o’s (observables).
We use the symbols ∪, ∩ and ¬ to represent the union, the intersection, and the com-
plement of events, respectively.
We wish to keep the notion of observables as general as possible, but we still need to
make some assumptions on them. First, we want the observables to be disjoint events.
Second, they must cover all possible outcomes. Third, an observable o must indicate
unambiguously whether a has taken place or not, i.e. it either implies a, or it implies
¬a. In set-theoretic terms it means that either o is contained in a or in the complement
of a. Formally:
Assumption 1 (Assumptions on the observables) 1. ∀ς ∈ Z . ∀o1, o2 ∈ O. o1 *=
o2 ⇒ pς(o1 ∪ o2) = pς(o1) + pς(o2)
2. ∀ς ∈ Z . pς(O) = 1
3. ∀ς ∈ Z . ∀o ∈ O. pς(o ∩ a) = pς(o) ∨ pς(o ∩ ¬a) = pς(o)
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Analogously, we need to make some assumption on the anonymous actions. We
consider here conditions tailored for the nondeterministic users: Each scheduler deter-
mines completely whether an action of the form a(i) takes place or not, and in the
positive case, there is only one such i. Formally:
Assumption 2 (Assumption on the anonymous actions for nondeterministic users)
∀ς ∈ Z . pς(a) = 0 ∨ (∃i ∈ I. (pς(a(i)) = 1 ∧ ∀j ∈ I. j *= i ⇒ pς(a(j)) = 0))
We are now ready to give the definition of anonymity for the case in which the
anonymous user is selected nondeterministically:
Definition 2 (Probabilistic anonymity for nondeterministic users).
A system (M, I, a,B,Z , p) is anonymous if
∀ς,ϑ ∈ Z . ∀o ∈ O. pς(a) = pϑ(a) = 1 ⇒ pς(o) = pϑ(o)
Intuitively, the above definition expresses the fact that, for every two possible non-
deterministic choices ς and ϑ which both select a, (say a(i) and a(j), with i and j
possibly different) it should not be possible to detect from the probabilistic measure of
the observables whether the choice was ς or ϑ (i.e. whether the user was i or j).
Example 2. Consider the DC with probabilistic coins and nondeterministic master. If
the coins can give both head and tail, then, for each scheduler which chooses a (i.e.
mip for some i), the possible observable events are 〈a, a, d〉, 〈a, d, a〉, 〈d, a, a〉, and
〈d, d, d〉 (〈r0, r1, r2〉 here represents the collective result out 0r0, out1r1, and out2r2).
In principle different schedulers would affect also the order in which the outputs are
emitted, but it is easy to see that the order, in this system, does not matter.
Consider the case in which the coins are totally fair, i.e. each of them gives head
and tail with 1/2 probability each. By considering all the 8 possible configurations of
the coins, 〈h, h, h〉, 〈h, h, t〉, . . . 〈t, t, t〉, it is easy to see that, for each possible payer i,
each of the above observables is produced by exactly two configurations and hence has
probability 1/4. Hence Definition 2 is verified.
Consider now the case in which the coins are biased. Say, Coin 0 and Coin1 give
head with probability 9/10 and tail with probability 1/10, and vice-versa Coin 2 gives
head with probability 1/10 and tail with probability 9/10. (This case is analogous to
that illustrated in Example 1). Let us consider the observable 〈a, a, d〉. In case Crypt 1
is the payer, then the probability to get 〈a, a, d〉 is equal to the probability that the result
of the coins is 〈h, h, t〉, plus the the probability that the result of the coins is 〈t, t, h〉,
which is 9/10 ∗ 9/10 ∗ 9/10+ 1/10 ∗ 1/10 ∗ 1/10 = 730/1000. In case Crypt 2 is the
payer, then the probability to get 〈a, a, d〉 is equal to the probability that the result of the
coins is 〈h, h, h〉, plus the the probability that the result of the coins is 〈t, t, t〉, which is
9/10 ∗ 9/10 ∗ 1/10 + 1/10 ∗ 1/10 ∗ 9/10 = 90/1000.
Hence, in the biased case, Definition 2 is not verified. And this is what we expect,
because the system, intuitively, is not anonymous: when we observe 〈a, a, d〉, Crypt 1
is much more likely to be the payer than Crypt 2.
As proved in the example above, the DC with fair coins are anonymous.
Proposition 1. The DC with probabilistic fair coins and nondeterministic master are
probabilistically anonymous.
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5 Probabilistic anonymity for users with combined probabilistic
and nondeterministic behavior
In this section we develop a notion of anonymity for the more general case in which
also the users may be selected according to some probabilistic distribution, possibly
combined with a nondeterministic selection.
An example of such kind of behavior in the DC can be obtained by specifying the
master as making first a nondeterministic choice on which probabilistic distribution to
apply for selecting the payer, and then a probabilistic choice.
An example of such a master in pip would be the following (p0, . . . , p3, q0, . . . , q3
represent the probabilities of the various decisions of the master)
Master = τ.Master1 + τ.Master2
Master1 =
∑2
i=0 pi τ .mip .mi⊕1n .mi⊕2n . 0
+ p3τ.m0n .m1n .m2n . 0
Master2 =
∑2
i=0 qi τ .mip .mi⊕1n .mi⊕2n . 0
+ q3τ.m0n .m1n .m2n . 0
Note that the choice in Master is nondeterministic while the choices in Master 1
andMaster 2 are probabilistic.
While the assumptions on the observables remain the same, the assumption on the
anonymous actions in this case is much weaker: the scheduler does not determine com-
pletely, in general, whether a is executed or not, and who is the user. However, we still
require that there be at most an user which performs a for each computation, i.e. a(i)
and a(j) must be disjoint for i *= j. Formally:
Assumption 3 (Assumption on the anonymous actions for users with combined
probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior)
∀ς ∈ Z . ∀i, j ∈ I. i *= j ⇒ pς(a(i) ∪ a(j)) = pς(a(i)) + pς(a(j))
The notion of anonymity, in this case, must take into account the probabilities of the
a(i)’s. When we observe a certain event o, the probability of o having been induced by
a(i)must be the same as the probability of o having been induced by a(j) for any other
j ∈ I . To formalize this notion, we need the concept of conditional probability. Given
two events x and y with p(y) > 0, the conditional probability of x given y is defined as
p(x | y) = p(x∩y)p(y) .
Definition 3 (Probabilistic anonymity for users with combined probabilistic and
nondeterministic behavior). A system (M, I, a,B,Z , p) is anonymous if
∀ς,ϑ ∈ Z . ∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O.
(pς(a(i)) > 0 ∧ pϑ(a(j)) > 0) ⇒ pς(o | a(i)) = pϑ(o | a(j))
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Example 3. Consider the DC with probabilistic coins and the nondeterministic and
probabilistic master illustrated above. Assume that the coins are totally fair. Consider a
scheduler ς which selectsMaster 1 and assume thatMaster 1 selects i ∈ I as the payer,
with probability pi. Consider now a scheduler ϑ which selects Master 2, and assume
that Master 2 selects j ∈ I as the payer, with probability qj . Again, the possible ob-
servable events are 〈a, a, d〉, 〈a, d, a〉, 〈d, a, a〉, and 〈d, d, d〉. By considering all the 8
possible configurations of the coins, it is easy to see that if the scheduler is ς and the
payer is i, each of the above observables is produced by exactly two configurations and
hence the conditional probability of that observable, given that i is the payer, is 1/4.
The same holds for ϑ and j, hence Definition 3 is verified.
The behavior of a master which combines nondeterministic and probabilistic behav-
ior can be much more complicated than the one illustrated above. However it is easy to
see that as long as the master does not influence the behavior of the coins, and these are
fair, the conditional probability of each observable for a given payer is 1/4.
Proposition 2. The DC with probabilistic fair coins and nondeterministic and proba-
bilistic master are probabilistically anonymous.
We terminate this section by giving an alternative characterization of anonymity.
Theorem 1. A system (M, I, a,B,Z , p) is anonymous iff
∀ς,ϑ ∈ Z . ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (pς(a(i)) > 0 ∧ pϑ(a) > 0) ⇒ pς(o | a(i)) = pϑ(o | a)
6 Probabilistic Anonymity for fully probabilistic users
In this section we consider the case of a totally probabilistic system. For instance, in the
case of the dining philosophers, the master would be of the form
Master =
∑2
i=0 pi τ .mip .mi⊕1n .mi⊕2n . 0
+ p3τ.m0n .m1n .m2n . 0
Furthermore, we would fix the scheduling of the parallel activities, so that each step in
the computation would be either deterministic or probabilistic.
Since there is no nondeterminism, there is no choice of scheduler either, so we can
eliminate Z from the tuple and we can write p(x) instead of p ς(x). The definition of
probabilistic anonymity given in previous section simplifies into the following:
Definition 4 (Probabilistic anonymity for probabilistic users).
A system (M, I, a,B, p) is anonymous if
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (p(a(i)) > 0 ∧ p(a(j)) > 0) ⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j))
Furthermore, the alternative characterization in Theorem 1 reduces to the following:
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Corollary 1. A system (M, I, a,B, p) is anonymous iff
∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (p(a(i)) > 0 ∧ p(a) > 0) ⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a)
In the fully probabilistic case there are two other interesting characterizations: The
first is based on the intuition that a system is anonymous if the observations do not
change the probability of a(i): we may know the probability of a(i) by some means
external to the system, but the system should not increase our knowledge about it (cfr.
[11]). The second is based on the (similar) idea that observing o rather than o ′ should
not change our knowledge of the probability of a(i). Formally:
Proposition 3. The following conditions are equivalent, and are equivalent to the con-
dition of anonymity.
1. ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o ∩ a) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i))/p(a)
2. ∀i ∈ I. ∀o, o′ ∈ O. (p(o ∩ a) > 0 ∧ p(o′ ∩ a) > 0) ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i) | o′).
Proposition 3 can be reformulated as a general property of probablistic spaces, in-
dependent from anonymity. Similar results have been presented in [10] and in [9].
6.1 Characterizations given by Proposition 3 and nondeterminism
It is not clear whether the characterizations expressed in Proposition 3 can be general-
ized to the case of the users with combined nondeterministic and probabilistic behavior.
The “naive” extensions obtained by introducing the scheduler in the formulae would
not work. Let us consider the first characterization in Proposition 3 (the other would be
analogous). One possible way of reintroducing the notion of scheduler is
∀ς,ϑ ∈ Z . ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O.
(pς(o ∩ a) > 0 ∧ pϑ(a) > 0) ⇒ pς(a(i) | o) = pϑ(a(i))/pϑ(a)
However this condition is too strong because it implies that pϑ(a(i))/pϑ(a) is the same
for every ϑ, and this is clearly not the case for instance for the nondeterministic and
probabilistic master specified in Section 5.
On the other hand, if we weaken the condition by identifying ς and ϑ:
∀ς ∈ Z . ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. pς(o ∩ a) > 0 ⇒ pς(a(i) | o) = pς(a(i))/pς(a)
then the condition would be too weak to ensure anonymity, as shown by next example:
Example 4. Consider a system in which the master influences the behavior of the coins
somehow, in such a way that whenCrypti is chosen as the payer (say, purely nondeter-
ministically, by ςi) the result is always o0 = 〈d, a, a〉 for i = 0, o1 = 〈a, d, a〉 for i = 1,
and o2 = 〈a, a, d〉 for i = 2. Then we would have pςi(oj ∩ a) > 0 only if j = i, and
pςi(a(i) | oi) = 1 = pςi(a(i))/pςi(a). Hence the above condition would be verified, but
the system is not be anonymous at all: whenever we observe 〈d, a, a〉, for instance, we
are sure that Crypt 0 is the payer.
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6.2 Independence from the probability distribution of the users
One important property of Definition 4 is that it is independent from the probability dis-
tribution of the users. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the condition of anonymity
implies that p(o | a(i)) = p(o)/p(a), hence it is independent from p(a(i)).
Theorem 2. If (M, I, a,B, p) is anonymous (according to Definition 4) then for any
p′ which differs from p only on the a(i)’s, (M, I, a,B, p ′) is anonymous.
Also the characterizations of anonymity given in Proposition 3 are (obviously) inde-
pendent from the probability distribution of the users. It should be remarked, however,
that their correspondence with Definition 4, and the property of independence from the
probability of the users, only holds under the hypothesis that there is at most one agent
performing a. (Assumption 3.)
7 Related work
The work [13] presents a modular framework to formalize a range of properties (in-
cluding numerous flavors anonymity and privacy) of computer systems in which an
observer has only partial information about system behavior, thereby combining the
benefits of the knowledge-based approach (natural specification of information-hiding)
and the algebra-based approach (natural specification of system behavior). It proposes
the notion of function view to represent a mathematical abstraction of partial knowledge
of a function. The logical formulas describing a property are characterized as opaque-
ness of certain function views, converted into predicates over observational equivalence
classes, and verified, when possible, using the proof techniques of the chosen process
formalism.
In [11, 26] epistemic logic is used to characterize a number of information-hiding
requirements (including anonymity). In particular, [26] introduces the notion of a group
principal and an associated model, language and logic to axiomatize anonymity. The
main advantage of modal logic is that even fairly complex properties can be stated
directly as formulas in the logic. On the other hand, [11] uses a completely seman-
tic approach and provides an appropriate semantic framework in which to consider
anonymity. It also propose notions of probabilistic anonymity in a purely probabilistic
framework. In particular, it propose a notion of conditional probability (cfr. Definition
4.4 in [11]) which is similar to the first characterization in Proposition 3, if we interpret
the formula ϕ in [11] as the occurrence of the event a.
The first characterization in Proposition 3 was also implicitly used by Chaum in [7]
(in which he considered a purely probabilistic system) as definition of anonymity. The
factor p(a) is not present in the formula of Chaum, but that’s probably a typo, because
in the informal explanation he gives, that factor is taken into account.
In literature there have been other works involving the use of variants of the pi-
calculus for formalizing protocols providing anonymity or similar properties. See for
example [1, 14].
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8 Conclusion and future work
We have proposed a new notion of anonymity based on a model which combines prob-
ability and nondeterminism, and we have shown that it can be regarded as a generaliza-
tion of the probabilistic one given in [11].
We have formulated the notion of anonymity in terms of observables for processes in
the probabilistic pi-calculus, whose semantics is based on the probabilistic automata of
[25]. This opens the way to the automatic verification of the property. We are currently
developing a model checker for the probabilistic pi-calculus.
We are currently investigating weaker versions of our notion of anonymity, and
studying their application to protocols like Crowds [8, 6].
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